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Kalashnikov Culture: Small Arms Proliferation and Irregular Warfare. By
Christopher Carr. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008.
Pp. xiv, 185. $75.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by William Perdue.
Failed state: the category seems irrevocably defined by what it is not.
These dangerous societies refuse to fit conveniently into the post-Cold War
international order; they lack the functional governments we expect of a
contemporary nation-state. None of this, of course, suggests what a failed state
is. In this thought-provoking monograph, Christopher Carr, an assistant
professor at the U.S. Air War College, endeavors to give a more satisfying
account of these perilous comers of the world stage, showing that they possess
their own cultural, political, and economic logic. Carr argues that the defining
factor spurring the creation and persistence of failed states is the global
proliferation of small arms. Small arms proliferation is so central to Carr's
understanding of these societies that he dubs them "Kalashnikov cultures"
after the Avtomat Kalashnikov of 1947, or AK-47, the world's most
ubiquitous and iconic light weapon.
Carr sets out to describe Kalashnikov cultures' inner workings and
significance, arguing that they share certain common elements and that
containing and suppressing them through small arms control and disarmament
should be high on the international agenda. After spending four chapters
outlining what Kalashnikov cultures are and how they function, Carr
examines a series of representative Kalashnikov cultures. The book closes
with several chapters of policy recommendations.
Throughout the book Carr makes clear that the defining feature of a
Kalashnikov culture is a particular relationship between the state's ability to
provide security and the individual's power to inflict violence. In an
environment of political instability where small arms find their way into the
hands of the civilian population, those civilians may take the provision of
security into their own hands as well. Before World War II, when military
arms could only be manufactured by a highly skilled industrial base and could
only be used effectively by a highly disciplined army, this kind of
democratization of military-grade violence was technologically impossible.
However, modem assault rifles like the AK-47 have given the individual, in
Carr's words, "the firepower of a seventeenth-century battalion or a
nineteenth-century infantry company" (p. 19). These weapons, moreover, can
be produced by semi-skilled labor and require almost no training as to their
use or maintenance.
The democratization of violence through small arms proliferation
inevitably complicates existing problems of governance. In some cases,
however, the process can actually threaten the primacy of the central
governing authority, and it is at this point that Kalashnikov enculturation
begins in earnest. As civilians realize that the state cannot protect them, they
acquire more weapons of their own, and arms traffickers mobilize to take
advantage of the commercial opportunity. Further proliferation breeds further
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insecurity, and as the process feeds on itself, civilians eventually become
dependent on small arms for their own safety. The weapons then take on deep
significance as commodities and as cultural symbols of power, masculinity,
modernity, and political independence, adding layers of complexity to any
future attempt at disarmament. Chronic insecurity causes the state to recede
further, creating wider openings for arms dealers, drug traffickers, organized
crime syndicates, and criminal entrepreneurs who exploit natural resources
that the state can no longer regulate. All of these actors soon acquire a stake in
a violent status quo, which they will then fight to maintain. Once Kalashnikov
enculturation begins, its self-sustaining logic can be extremely difficult to
reverse.
Carr provides concrete historical evidence for his understanding of
Kalashnikov cultures through a series of five chapter-length case studies. The
strongest by far is his case study of Pakistan, which Carr describes as the
"prototypical Kalashnikov culture" (p. 53). Indeed, Pakistani officials first
coined the term "Kalashnikov culture" to refer to the destabilizing panoply of
interconnected problems afflicting their country in the late 1980s. Over the
course of the Soviet-American Afghan War, weapons from that conflict had
steadily made their way into the hands of tribes who resided in western
Pakistan but were only nominally under the control of its central government.
These arms escalated the lethality of ongoing tribal blood feuds, and a huge
influx of Afghani refugees further exacerbated the resultant instability.
Tensions in southeastern Pakistan between the native population and those
who settled there after the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, meanwhile,
created a second source of instability. In response, arms from the tribal areas
soon began to flow to the cities of Hyderabad and Karachi. Carr competently
describes how small arms proliferation in Pakistan transformed a set of
difficult but manageable political problems into a m6lange of chronic
insecurity, drug trafficking, organized crime, and political factionalism and
fragmentation that continues to threaten the state to this day.
Carr's remaining case studies complete the analytical heart of his
argument, but they make for some of the book's least arresting reading. The
Pakistani example is followed by chapters about eastern Uganda, Liberia, and
Yemen. The final chapter of the section analyzes Jamaica, Papua New Guinea,
and Brazil all together. Each of these case studies is peppered with allusions
and comparisons to still more Kalashnikov cultures, resulting in an overly
ambitious array of source material for a short monograph. While Carr's
considerable research into each of these societies is apparent, he is not an
expert on any of them. As a result, the case studies come off as fragmentary
and incomplete, and readers who cannot rely on prior knowledge about these
countries may find themselves frustrated by the lack of context. As a result,
Kalashnikov Culture drags considerably while Caff repeatedly reinforces his
key propositions with historical evidence that lacks sufficient depth to add
much to his argument.
Carr, nevertheless, marshals enough evidence in aggregate to make his
recommendations convincing. Kalashnikov cultures may have their own logic,
but they are not benign. Apart from their extreme violence, they distort and
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disrupt local economies, ravage the natural environment, provide safe havens
for international criminals and terrorists, and can spread and destabilize entire
regions. Initial international efforts to curb small arms proliferation (which
resulted in the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in the summer of 2001) attempted unsuccessfully to generate an
international convention similar to the convention on landmines. After ably
documenting the faulty assumptions that led to this failure, Carr evaluates
some of the regional, national, and local initiatives that have followed and
finds a decidedly mixed record. Some weapons buyback programs and
disarmament campaigns, like an arms-for-development-projects program in
Albania, were able to make improvements; others, like a new gun control law
in Brazil, seem not to have had much effect at all. Still others, like the
Ugandan army's incursions into its troubled eastern province of Karamoja,
only made things worse. Carr advocates several eminently sensible proposals,
like standardizing the documents states use to authenticate arms transfers and
requiring manufacturers to place identifying marks on every weapon they
make, but he concludes that there is no "magic bullet" (p. 145).
In the end, Carr's claim boils down to a common-sense contention that
the international community will be able to contain and address the issues
presented by failed states only when it recognizes that small arms are not a
small problem. The connection between arms proliferation and destabilizing
violence is in some ways quite intuitive, but Carr's contribution is important
nonetheless. His outline of the basic dynamics of how Kalashnikov cultures
function pushes the conversation about these dangerous societies forward, and
his use of cross-cultural analysis, if imperfectly executed here, should serve as
a methodological guide for future inquiries. By focusing so intently on the
role small arms proliferation plays in these societies, Carr illuminates a way to
think proactively about how to prevent the emergence of Kalashnikov cultures
rather than reacting to the problems they create. The U.S. military currently
finds itself conducting wars in two Kalashnikov cultures-Afghanistan and
Iraq. Carr's book is an invitation to look beyond these immediate conflicts and
consider what forces create these dangerous environments, what factors
sustain their brand of violence, and what steps can prevent them from coming
into being in the first place. Kalashnikov Culture raises far more questions
than it answers, but it answers just enough to provide a platform for further
study.
Tort Liability for Human Rights Abuses. By George P. Fletcher. Portland, Or.:
Hart Publishing, 2008. Pp. 214. $35.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Alex
Iftimie.
Despite growing debate and litigation involving the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA), surprisingly few books address the topic. Even fewer attempt to
contextualize current ATCA claims within the historical foundations of tort
law dating back to eighteenth-century European law. George Fletcher's Tort
Liability for Human Rights Abuses fills this niche admirably, offering an
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arresting and unique analysis of the theory and the history underlying modem
human rights tort claims.
Fletcher begins his concise story with a discussion of the basic elements
underlying ATCA litigation, including the peculiarities of the law that allow
foreigners to sue other foreigners for violations of the law of nations that
occur outside the United States. He addresses the development of universal
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, and the incorporation of customary
international law into U.S. common law.
Critically, Fletcher provides a broad overview of the progression of
ATCA litigation since the Act was resurrected in the 1980 Filartiga decision.
He traces the case law from Filartiga (which recognized liability under ATCA
for state-sponsored violations of international human rights) through Karadzic
(which imposed liability on private individuals for genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity) and up to recent cases such as Khulumani (which
extend liability to corporate facilitators of human rights abuses). Fletcher
predicts that these latter cases, against corporations who fund and provide
essential services for mass atrocities, represent the future of ATCA litigation,
leaving the principal wrongdoers to be prosecuted by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and other tribunals. For those familiar with recent
ATCA litigation, this prediction is neither new nor bold. The book provides,
however, meaningful analysis of how we have arrived at this point, including
a practical appendix summarizing the most important ATCA cases to date.
Fletcher discusses at length the unique position of human rights claims
under ATCA-a body of law that stands at the intersection of tort and
criminal law principles. In merging portions of the two fields, Fletcher
develops his own "paradigm of aggression" to differentiate plaintiffs' claims,
arguing that the successful ones are likely to involve victims who are the
passive objects of domination by an aggressor.
Fletcher's book complements other recent works on ATCA litigation.
Jeffery Davis's Justice Across Borders-also published last year--examines
how ATCA litigation plays out in U.S. courts, anchoring that analysis with
illuminating interviews with former Justice and State Department officials
involved in such litigation. Beth Stephens et al. published the second edition
of International Human Rights Litigation in US. Courts, which provides
human rights litigators and activists with a manual for handling ATCA and
Torture Victim Protection Act claims in U.S. courts. While Davis and
Stephens provide a detailed foundation for the mechanics of ATCA litigation,
Fletcher fills in the historical and theoretical foundations that undergird these
lawsuits.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, Fletcher's contribution
is particularly valuable for continuing ATCA litigation. In the Court's
plurality opinion, Justice Souter held that future ATCA claims will have to be
based on "definable, universal, and obligatory norms" similar to those present
in the "ambient law" of 1789 when ATCA was enacted. To meet this
standard, future plaintiffs will need to compare present claims under the law
of nations with their "historical antecedents." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 732 (2004). Fletcher's work provides much of that background. He
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engages in expansive discussions of German and French tort law, outlining the
historical debates from which the modem legal questions arose. Fletcher is
most persuasive when explaining the finer points of Blackstone's
Commentaries and engaging in a comparative law analysis of international
and U.S. law. The book serves as a reference for practitioners looking for a
connection between their client's claims and violations of the law of nations in
1789.
Fletcher's work, despite its considerable contribution, has several
glaring shortcomings. First, it is exceedingly retrospective. Fletcher offers
little discussion of the future of ATCA litigation and generally seems more
concerned with rehashing old debates in tort law than with applying his
paradigms to future litigation. While Fletcher asserts repeatedly that cases
against corporate defenders are the future of ATCA litigation---even ending
the book by noting that "this will be the way we correct evil in the twenty-first
century" (p. 175)--he leaves the reader yearning for more. Fletcher avoids
questions as to what kinds of claims will be actionable under ATCA, stating
only "no one knows for sure. The field awaits proper theoretical
refinement . . . ." (p. 130). Given his impressive historical analysis and
expertise in the field, Fletcher is well situated to provide the answer.
Second, the book promises more than it delivers. The back cover and
publisher's note suggest that Fletcher will examine new controversies in the
field, including Agent Orange litigation, liability for terrorism, litigation
against corporations that assist the U.S. military in committing war crimes,
and compensation through the ICC. These topics are noted only in passing. In
fact, Agent Orange litigation is referenced only in the appendix where
Fletcher summarizes two cases against Dow Chemical, a manufacturer of
Agent Orange.
Lastly, Fletcher often strays far from his discussion of human rights tort
claims and ATCA, getting lost in esoteric discussions of tort theory. For
instance, over the course of chapters two and three, human rights and the
ATCA are mentioned in only two paragraphs. Fletcher instead re-illustrates
tort textbook hypotheticals and engages in a protracted comparison of the
efficiency, corrective justice, and reciprocity theories underlying tort claims.
Tort Liability for Human Rights Abuses too often reads like an amalgamation
of tort and criminal law theory with little relation to either ATCA or human
rights abuses.
Nonetheless, the book is a must-read for anyone wishing to understand
the broader historical foundations of modern human rights tort claims.
Fletcher deserves credit for bringing his expansive knowledge of international
criminal law and torts to an evolving human rights field.
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Military Occupations in the Age of Self-determination: The History Neocons
Neglected. By James Gannon. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security
International, 2008. Pp. xi, 202. $54.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Joshua Alexander Geltzer.
In his new book, Military Occupations in the Age of Self-determination,
James Gannon promises to bring to light the history allegedly neglected by
America's so-called "neocons." The narrative that Gannon provides of the
floundering, frustrating, and frequently futile experiences of earlier occupying
powers in their efforts to counter insurgencies is well told and of considerable
relevance to America's current dilemmas in Afghanistan and Iraq. There is a
problem, however: by Gannon's own account, this history was not really
neglected by American policymakers in their decision to go to war in Iraq. In
fact, it is far from certain that even as sobering a history as the one provided
by Gannon would influence any potential occupier, for the crucial reason that
states rarely, if ever, consciously and deliberately choose to fight an
insurgency. Much more often, international powers suddenly and unwillingly
find themselves in the midst of an insurgency, and the question becomes:
"What now?" Therefore, the history of previous struggles to counter
insurgencies is rarely truly neglected by a great power like the United States;
instead, such history is thought utterly irrelevant given a great power's
intention to avoid having to face an insurgency entirely.
Gannon's basic argument is that in confronting an insurgency in Iraq,
"from the start, the historical odds have been heavily against an American
victory" (p. 160). History, Gannon avows, reveals that occupying forces
conducting counterinsurgency operations rarely achieve any sort of victory.
He culls evidence for this claim from a smattering of case studies involving
what Gannon deems "five great powers since 1945" (p. 3). Surveying the
British experience in Palestine, the French quandary in Algeria, the American
difficulties in Vietnam, the Israeli situations in Lebanon and in the Palestinian
territories, and the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, Gannon concludes that
with the exception of Israel in the Palestinian territories, none of these
occupying powers could credibly claim any sustained success in attempting to
counter an insurgency. The decades that Gannon spent as a journalist at NBC
News serve him well as he narrates the incidents crisply and succinctly,
concisely underscoring key incidents, evocatively characterizing influential
individuals, and making a compelling claim for the general potential for
history to inform the work of policymakers.
Yet Gannon's own final, central account of the American experience in
Iraq calls into question whether such history was, as he argues, neglected by
American decisionmakers as they moved toward war in Iraq. He asserts, "The
Bush Administration's idea for Iraq was a quick war, a smooth turnover from
dictatorship to democracy, and a fast exit" (p. 143). While other accounts have
suggested that certain American decisionmakers had a different vision, by
Gannon's own reckoning the United States never intended to be a sustained
occupier, or certainly to conduct counterinsurgency operations. On that basis,
the history presented by Gannon was not so much neglected by American
decisionmakers as deemed irrelevant to their plans because, according to
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Gannon, they wanted to get in and get out without ever halting long enough
for an insurgency to develop.
Moreover, Gannon's harshest words for the Bush administration have
little to do with issues of occupation and counterinsurgency. Some of
Gannon's fiercest barbs emerge from his claim that the Bush administration
exaggerated the threat that Iraq posed to America. He writes that "this book
seeks to make the very practical point, that the Iraq invasion was a risky, even
reckless endeavor against a foe that posed no imminent threat to the United
States" (p. 160). Yet, this emphasis on the overestimation of the Iraqi threat is
distinct from the issue of the historical odds being stacked against an
occupier's success in countering an insurgency. In other words, what Gannon
underscores as most fundamentally flawed about the Bush administration's
approach to Iraq bears little relation to the historical lessons with which the
book is primarily concerned.
In fact, recognition of a fundamental aspect of counterinsurgency reveals
that Gannon's thesis is, in a sense, tautological. He writes that "the great
power almost always loses when a credible insurgency rises up to challenge
it" (p. 10). This notion-that a great power generally loses when a credible
insurgency arises-misses the crucial point that the emergence of a credible
insurgency is itself a symptom of the great power already having, at least
initially, lost. So, to the extent that the Bush administration envisioned quickly
rolling into and out of Iraq, the emergence of a credible insurgency to thwart a
fast and easy transition to democracy already revealed the failure of
America's initial plan. Moreover, to the extent that fighting the insurgency in
Iraq has proven a greater risk to U.S. national security than that previously
posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, the two risks were never weighed by the
Bush administration because coping with the former was never deemed
necessary for confronting the latter. However good or bad America's reasons
were for going to war in Iraq, and however good or bad America's initial plan
was for doing so, once American forces were still in Iraq and found
themselves facing an insurgency, "Plan A," so to speak, had already failed.
Fighting an insurgency was never part of Plan A-just as it was never a
part of the original plans of Britain in Palestine, France in Algeria, Israel in
Lebanon, and so on. Rather, in a manner similar to those and other occupiers
who ultimately confronted insurgencies, the United States woke up one day in
Iraq and realized that an insurgency was upon it. The central question had
never been, "Can we defeat an insurgency if we invade Iraq?" To the contrary,
as is almost always the case, the key question, once an insurgency arose, was:
"What now?" Had Gannon presented the argument that, in going to war in
Iraq, American decisionmakers should have expected, based on lessons from
history, that an insurgency would arise, that might have provided a compelling
critique indeed. But that is not his thesis.
Despite the book's questionable premises, Gannon presents important
and interesting case studies that reveal historical commonalities well worth
sustained reflection. Emerging starkly and repeatedly is the tendency of
occupying forces to commit the very instigations that generate credible
insurgencies. In Palestine, "the British pursued policies that infuriated the
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resistance organizations," harassing Jewish immigrants, and even going so far
as to send some to detention camps in Cyprus, thereby stoking the very seeds
of resentment that would eventually expel Britain (p. 40). American policies
of relocation and imprisonment in Vietnam drove many Vietnamese "into the
arms of the Vietcong," empowering insurgent forces at the expense of the
occupier (p. 76). Similarly, the more harshly Israel responded to Hezbollah's
acts of resistance in Lebanon, "the more it strengthened Hezbollah's standing
with the Lebanese people" (p. 97). Time after time, insurgencies gained
widespread traction only when the occupying forces stoked discontent that
could be directed back at those very forces.
Moreover, as that dynamic escalated, the occupier tended to respond on
the basis of anger rather than calculated strategy, engendering still more
counterproductive animosity. Gannon captures this tendency well: "The
British lashed out half-blind with rage" in Palestine, as did many subsequent
occupiers, including the successors to the very Israeli leaders who had so
effectively provoked the British (p. 39). Indeed, that strategy of provocation
on the part of insurgents is another theme of Gannon's case studies, which
show how insurgents intentionally induce occupying forces to respond out of
anger rather than out of strategy, and thus produce sympathy and even support
for those who would challenge the occupiers.
Another important theme is that a turning point often emerges when the
occupier, having recognized the existence of a credible, entrenched
insurgency, begins to rethink its own interests and to see them as more in line
with withdrawal than with continued occupation. The French experience in
Algeria epitomized this reversal, with the French populace first responding to
news of violence by demanding "tougher measures," but then shifting towards
"negative feelings about the war [that] more than nullified the French victory
on the ground" (p. 54). Once a populace or government concludes that
withdrawal is preferable to continued occupation, even tactical advances
cannot salvage an effort at counterinsurgency. In other words, the venture
hinges on what answer the occupier gives to the question of "what now?"
Does the occupier choose continued occupation, accepting all of the burdens
and challenges of trying to counter an insurgency, or does the occupier figure
out how best to pack up and go home at the earliest possible moment?
Indeed, lurking at the end of the book is what might be Gannon's real, if
underarticulated, thesis: "By adhering to a goal of military victory, Bush not
only deceives himself, he defies the odds of history, which are unfavorable for
occupiers" (p. 165). This claim might be Gannon's main point-not that
American decisionmakers ignored history in going to war in Iraq, but that they
did so in persisting in Iraq even after a credible insurgency arose. How history
will judge America's efforts at counterinsurgency in Iraq remains to be seen.
What must be acknowledged immediately, however, is that the alternative to
continued American involvement in Iraq is not merely to respect locals' "right
to be burdened with their own problems," as it was for France vis-a-vis the
Algerians (p. 57). Various foreign hands have reached deep inside Iraq,
grasping and tugging at its political soul. For America, the question remains
how best to help Iraqis to fend off those foreign reaches and allow Iraq to take
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its rightful place in today's "Age of Self-Determination." In the face of an
unanticipated but enduring insurgency, that priority must guide today's
Plan B.
Optimal Protection of International Law: Navigating Between European
Absolutism and American Voluntarism. By Joost Pauwelyn. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp. xxx, 238. $80.00 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Jayme Herschkopf.
In Optimal Protection of International Law, Joost Pauwelyn strives for
no less than an all-encompassing model by which to consider and prescribe
international law today, navigating between unrealistic ideals on one side and
overreliance on efficiency on the other. The author's personal and
professional backgrounds position him well for such a wide-ranging study. In
addition to his pan-continental education, Pauwelyn has worked in the legal
affairs division of the World Trade Organization and taught at Duke
University School of Law for five years. He brings his plethora of
perspectives to bear in this book, and in doing so self-consciously aims to
bridge American and European approaches to international law.
Pauwelyn begins his discussion by defining two extremes on the
spectrum of views regarding the purpose of international law. On one side is
the "absolutist" perspective he identifies with European scholars, who say that
in all cases, the stronger international law can be made, the better. On the
other side is economic voluntarism, corresponding with American thought,
where efficiency is sought above all else, and the ideal international legal
system is one that allows for the greatest freedom of action. While admitting
these poles are caricaturish "ideal-types," Pauwelyn stresses their
pervasiveness in legal scholarship (p. 18). He offers a brief consideration of
why these contrasting approaches to international law have developed, and
what the ramifications are within each system, but he leaves those arguments
largely to other sources. He sets to one side all so-called "metaquestions" of
why international law has arrived at its current status, and focuses instead on
how we can consider that status and improve upon it.
The simplicity of Pauwelyn's argument belies its innovation: he
proposes applying to international law the domestic three-pronged structure of
entitlements that Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed elaborated in their
1972 Harvard Law Review article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral. An entitlement, according to the
article, is a more appropriate way of referring to a legal right, in that the
designation highlights that there can be different types of entitlements. Each
distinct right, now called an entitlement, in turn corresponds to a different
level of legal protection, and, Pauwelyn adds, a different level of backup
reinforcement should that rule be disobeyed. Because there are multiple
categories of entitlements, one set can be identified as less vital by assigning a
lower level of protection without endangering the inalienability of more
valued entitlements.
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Pauwelyn argues that "by default, entitlements under international law
ought to be protected by a property rule" (p. 102). That is, entitlements should
be transferable only by consent of both parties. If for whatever reason it is
determined that an entitlement should not be transferrable, even with the
consent of both parties, that entitlement becomes inalienable. Pauwelyn
matches inalienable entitlements to jus cogens and the "European absolutist"
view that "once allocated, international entitlements cannot be modified or
traded" (p. 16). If, on the other hand, it is determined that an entitlement can
be transferred even against the wishes of the current holder, that entitlement is
protected only by a liability rule, corresponding to the "American voluntarist"
opinion that "allocation of international entitlements is a mere pledge which
states can renege on, based on a simple cost-benefit analysis" (p. 17). Liability
entitlements allow for a so-called "efficient breach," and are acceptable so
long as the loser of the entitlement is compensated.
The book focuses on the second step of Pauwelyn's argument, namely,
the process of ascribing different types of protection once the entitlements
have been identified as worthy of preserving. It is here, Pauwelyn argues, that
there is room for the greatest innovation. He points out that both extremes,
inalienable entitlements and those protected by liability rules, are predicated
on "market intervention by the state or some higher authority" (p. 7). This not
only requires greater oversight-a distinct difficulty in international law,
which often lacks central authoritative bodies-but also greater expense.
Therefore, whenever lawmakers suggest moving certain entitlements from the
property category to one of the others, that move must be justified with
reference to a number of factors and concerns.
Pauwelyn also emphasizes that the protection afforded to entitlements ex
ante should be distinguished from the enforcement available when those
entitlements have been denied ex post. He describes the paradox: the strongest
protection, inalienability, may "benefit[] only from the weakest form of back-
up enforcement" (p. 150), that is, a liability rule. He fights the notion of
"reverse-engineering" (p. 146), wherein one would choose what level of
protection to offer based on the remedies available once that protection has
been breached, and stresses instead the surprising effectiveness of his
alternative split structure, the potency of which is based largely on what he
calls "community costs" (p. 157). A combination of community pressure,
concern for reputation, and fear of emulation in the future will cause states to
conform to a property rule of international law more than they would under
domestic law, even when only a liability rule is available for enforcement if
they do breach.
Pauwelyn himself identifies some potential problems with his argument.
Many he refutes with detailed and systematic counterarguments, while he
downplays others with constant reminders that "entitlements can be protected
by hybrid regimes . . . [and] all three rules of protection come in different
degrees" (p. 34); one of the book's core messages is that "international law
has reached a degree of maturity that gives it the luxury, indeed the obligation,
of variable protection" (p. 200). Larger theoretical issues also remain. It is
unclear, for example, whether we can even conceive of states as rational
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actors in the first place-an objection that casts doubt on the validity of his
model. Furthermore, states are not unitary actors, and so their representatives
may not always act in the aggregate best interest of their constituents.
Refreshingly, Pauwelyn does not try to offer superficial rationalizations or
underplay the significance of such objections, but rather identifies them,
analyzes them, and lets them stand. That intellectual candor is somewhat
undermined, unfortunately, by his choice in the fourth chapter not to
distinguish the jump from inalienability to property rule from that of property
rule to liability rule when arguing for lower and higher levels of protection.
The effect of this collapse, intentional or otherwise, is to make
counterarguments weaker and harder to articulate than they might have been if
the steps were considered separately.
The precision and elegance of the book's thesis sometimes makes it
difficult to conceive of how it could be applied in practice. Many of the
proposals are most easily read as constructing an ideal ex ante framework
rather than being used to analyze and improve international law. Indeed, one
of Pauwelyn's principal assumptions is that "the necessary tools are available
to induce or even force states to comply" (p. 2), a highly contestable claim.
Pauwelyn counters such objections by pointing to several scholars who argue
that international law is in fact growing stronger. With more potential areas
for alternative types of reinforcement, including, where appropriate, stronger
ones, the range of instances in which his recommendations could realistically
be applied would expand as well. In the book's preface, Anne-Marie
Slaughter points out that one of the most appropriate fora for application of
Pauwelyn's structure would be regime design, especially instances where an
institution is being constructed (or reconstructed) from the most elementary of
levels, and therefore is open to the greatest innovation.
Ultimately, Pauwelyn's combination of simplicity and flexibility make
his thesis both idealistic and pragmatic. Stripped of encumbering theoretical
questions and concerns, he is able to offer a precisely ordered image of how
broadly to reconceive the international legal system. His pointed proposals
then leave the reader cautiously optimistic about their potential
implementation, and convinced that following his lead will create not only a
clearer body of international law but also a more effective one.
The Economic Structure of International Law. By Joel P. Trachtman.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pp. ix, 349. $55.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Sharanya Sai Mohan.
In The Economic Structure of International Law, Joel Trachtman
demonstrates that a thorough, well-argued evaluation of international law
through the lens of law and economics does not have to attack the legitimacy
and value of the legal system. His book provides a rational choice-based
framework for international law that focuses on its potential rather than its
limits. It uses social-scientific techniques to develop an understanding of how
authority is allocated in international society and why states may want to
modify or transfer that allocation.
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Trachtman begins by arguing for the use of economic methodologies to
understand the consequences of formulating international institutions and
policies. These economic methods, the book contends, are "committed to
liberalism" and shun the advocacy that shapes other legal scholarship on
international law (p. 4). For the most part, the author stays true to this promise
and avoids advocating for anything except the use of economic methods to
understand this field. After establishing the utility of economic analysis in the
field of international law, the rest of the book applies this analysis to the basic
structural issues at the heart of international law, such as jurisdiction,
international organization, norm formation, and dispute resolution.
Arguing that jurisdiction in the international realm is akin to property,
Trachtman views the initial establishment of jurisdiction, as well as the
transfer of jurisdiction, as transactions. These transactions occur through the
mechanisms of "custom, treaty, and organization," each of which is treated in
a separate chapter (p. 72). The third chapter focuses on game theory to
demonstrate that multilateral, rational interactions between states can lead to
standardized social norms that become customary international law. By tying
the international legal order to rational choice, Trachtman avoids unpersuasive
idealism and makes it easier for the reader skeptical of international law to
accept his vision of how states form and comply with customary international
legal norms. In the next chapter, Trachtman emphasizes that the binding
nature of a treaty itself is dependent upon customary international law. After
establishing this relationship, he goes on to analogize a treaty to a contract in
the domestic context, using cooperative game theory to show that treaties
come about much like contracts and offering remedies that discourage
inefficient breaches. The chapters devoted to the discussion of the importance
of custom and social norms in the formation of the structure of international
law convincingly demonstrate that the foundation of international law is
formed from "a fabric of rational acts" created by a complex network of
human and state interaction (p. 72).
Having described these two methods of transacting authority, the book
then examines international organizations as an alternative to transactions that
become necessary because transactions are costly. It develops a model of an
"institutional response to transaction costs" based on institutional economics
and the theory of the firm (p. 151). Trachtman sees institution formation in the
international sphere as similar to that in the domestic sphere; states rationally
sacrifice some power to gain the greater benefits of being part of the
institution. The difference, he argues, is only one of degree. Finally,
Trachtman extends his industrial organization analysis to the role of
adjudication in this international legal scheme that he has so carefully
outlined. His chapter on international adjudication delves into the effects of
various levels of judicial power, as well as levels of private access to the
judicial process, upon the allocation of authority between international
players. Honing in on comparative cost-benefit analysis as an effective device
for determining an optimum level of private access, the chapter lists several
normative considerations to be taken into account during that cost-benefit
analysis. The arguments in this chapter are weakened because, unlike those in
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other chapters, no formal economic model is used to substantiate them.
However, the author does consider the role of private, nonstate actors such as
NGOs and citizens within the international legal scheme.
Perhaps the most commendable aspect of the book is its breadth. It
provides a solid overview of international law, covers a large number of
economic methodologies, and manages to combine the two in a way that
creates an original argument without being repetitive or confusing. One
element notably absent from the book is the use of empirical methodologies.
This omission is surprising because Trachtman acknowledges a need for
empiricism in the field by setting out an agenda for future empirical
researchers. Still, the book is rich with examples of where international law
works and where it fails to induce compliance and align results with
preferences. Perhaps the empirical investigation of his arguments would be
enough for a separate book. It is surprising, however, that such a thorough
examination of the structure of international law does not attempt an empirical
examination.
Throughout the work, the author maintains a balanced outlook and a
clear, strictly scientific voice that matches his rigorous adherence to social-
scientific analysis. While acknowledging that all of the international law
elements he discusses can be the subject of vigorous normative debates, and
giving examples of other scholars' normative arguments, the author rarely
engages in such debates himself. One side effect of this is that the book
occasionally reads more like a textbook than a scholarly work. However,
Trachtman's intention, as he spells out from the beginning, is to "map the
international legal system" to start the process of developing a system that
maximizes the preferences of a society, rather than to make prescriptive
arguments about those preferences. On that score, the work delivers.
International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects. By Ana
Filipa Vrdoljak. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pp.
xxxviii, 342. $48.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Scarlet Kim.
For decades, Incan artifacts from the lost city of Machu Picchu have
evoked wonder among visitors to the Yale Peabody Museum. But rarely does
wonder inspire curiosity about how these objects came to be in New Haven.
High school students study the savageries of Spanish conquest of the
Americas, but seldom consider the physical traces of a history of
dispossession that remain. Demands for restitution of cultural objects by their
communities of origin necessarily and rightfully force us to address this
history. International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects
evaluates this process of removal and return.
Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, a lecturer at the University of Western Australia,
urges readers to recognize that violence informs the emergence of an
international legal framework to protect cultural heritage. Her study begins
with British claims to objects seized by French forces during the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Periods of warfare and genocide order
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the rest of the book. Behind each major attempt to enshrine protections for
cultural objects in international law lies large-scale devastation. Cultural
restitution provisions in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles allowed for the return of
cultural objects to those European states that sustained massive cultural
damage during the First World War. These provisions lay the foundation for
the codification of cultural heritage protection during armed conflict in several
international treaties in the 1930s. Nazi Germany's requisition of Jewish
cultural patrimony catalyzed international efforts to protect the cultural
heritage of minority groups after the Second World War.
Forged from conflict, international approaches to cultural restitution bear
the influence of victorious states. By exposing the normative assumptions that
underlie these approaches, Vrdoljak reveals their inequities. The cultural
restitution provisions in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles applied to France and
Belgium. However, non-European communities ravaged by World War I did
not fare as well. Communities formerly under German or Ottoman rule were
denied the right to cultural restitution and were subject to the "trust" of an
appointed mandating power. Vrdoljak argues that the distinction reflected an
imperialist approach; formerly colonized states were considered too primitive
to properly exercise control and care over their cultural heritage. In the
interwar period, the International Museums Office (OIM) accommodated
Anglo-American interests by privileging the restitution of cultural objects
removed from museums as opposed to those removed from archaeological
sites. The result was to protect the established collections of colonial powers
while leaving "unknown" objects of formerly occupied communities
vulnerable to looting. The OIM justified this distinction by appealing to
Anglo-American free trade principles encouraging open access to unprotected
archaeological sites.
Ironically, the Anglo-American variant of capitalism has come under
attack from some European states, such as France, that have directly benefited
from such principles in the area of cultural restitution law. Broadly speaking,
European critics of Anglo-American market capitalism argue that encouraging
resource alienability can have dramatic social effects. Of course, these critics
are referring primarily to the effects such transfers have on their own
societies. Nevertheless, this argument holds particularly true for communities
seeking restitution of cultural objects that have entered the global
marketplace. According to Vrdoljak, the loss of cultural objects dilutes the
collective memory of these communities, undermining their efforts to
establish a robust cultural identity.
At the same time, these objects may have averted imminent destruction
by virtue of their transfer from one community to another. Recently, the
Chinese government claimed ownership of two Qing dynasty bronzes for sale
at a Paris Christie's auction on the grounds that they were looted from the
Summer Palace by Anglo-French forces during the Second Opium War in
1860. While drawing on past acts of violence to assert present claims to the
bronzes, China ignored another piece of the narrative. Following the
establishment of the Chinese Communist state, the government engaged in
willful destruction of its own cultural heritage, particularly during the Cultural
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Revolution in the mid-1960s. These acts do not justify Western looting, but
they complicate the story. The bronzes not only survived but also became
embedded within a new historical narrative involving the possessor nation.
Vrdoljak untangles these narrative strands by closely examining the
process of cultural acquisition and restitution in Great Britain, the United
States, and Australia. Focusing primarily on the collections of national
museums in each state, Vrdoljak illustrates the importance of foreign cultural
objects to the national identity of the possessor nation. In the case of
nineteenth-century Great Britain, Vrdoljak draws a connection between the
collection and display of objects and an evolving sense of imperial self. Her
discussion includes the astute observation that the former India Museum in
London did not simply display a collection of Indian cultural objects, but was
also a record of how the British collected Indian cultural objects. Recognizing
this relationship between cultural object and national imagination deepens our
understanding of cultural restitution. Cultural restitution involves more than
the return of an object; it forces a nation to redefine its conception of itself.
Vrdoljak's study suggests important tensions between the evolution of
international cultural heritage law and the acquisition policies of states such as
Great Britain. The experience of destruction during warfare compelled Great
Britain to agitate for the international protection of cultural heritage. At the
same time, this principle came into conflict with Great Britain's own
collection policies with regard to the cultural objects of its colonial subjects.
The structure of the book, however, hinders Vrdoljak from effectively fleshing
out this irony. Rather than presenting a single coherent picture, Vrdoljak
subdivides each chapter into two distinct modes of inquiry-a chronological
summary of developments in international cultural heritage law followed by a
British, American, or Australian case study. The transitions between the two
lines of inquiry are choppy and leave the reader disoriented.
In contrast to the stark divisions in her chapters, Vrdoljak erroneously
conflates claims raised by former colonial subjects against Great Britain with
those by indigenous groups against the United States and Australia. She
makes the troubling assumption that the same analytical framework should
apply to the claims raised by each group. Thus, she measures each type of
claim against protections afforded by international law, while giving short
shrift to domestic legislation that attempts to address the protection of
indigenous cultural heritage. She laments the fact that the cultural restitution
rights of Native Americans are defined not by international law, but by U.S.
regulations. Indigenous peoples themselves have pushed for the recognition of
cultural rights within the international legal system. However, Vrdoljak's
study could still benefit from a more substantive discussion of how these
communities negotiate their identity and rights within their dominant states.
Vrdoljak's emphasis on international law to resolve cultural restitution
claims reflects an unwarranted optimism in its potential. This position is
puzzling given her valiant attempts to expose its underlying biases. Direct
bilateral negotiations between the possessor state and community of origin are
an alternative Vrdoljak largely dismisses. A bilateral framework could better
facilitate the "moral restitution" Vrdoljak insists must accompany the return of
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a cultural object, by forcing both sides to engage in a direct conversation
about the historical circumstances behind the original dispossessory act.
Unfortunately, Vrdoljak repudiates bilateralism as an Anglo-American
negotiating preference that places former colonized states or indigenous
groups at an inherent disadvantage.
The triumphant display of colonial trophies shaped the identities of the
world's great imperial nations. Devastating violence and the dismantling of
empire forced a retelling of the stories of these "acquisitions." International
Law, Museums, and the Return of Cultural Objects may not provide an answer
to the vexing question of how we properly return a cultural object that is not
rightfully ours. But by opening our eyes to the complex and often ugly history
behind the removal and return of cultural objects, Vrdoljak forces us to see
that this process changes both collectors and collected.
